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This paper investigates how the abolishment of a ban on tuition fees affects the quality of higher education with 
centralized and decentralized decision making. It is shown that tuition fees fully crowd public funds under 
centralization and quality of university education does not improve. However, with decentralized decisions total higher 
education spending increases in the tuition level. Therefore, decentralization can lead to a higher quality of university 
education than centralization although the opposite holds when funding is restricted to be public. 
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 2 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
1 Introduction
Does the introduction of tuition fees improve the quality of higher education? Numerous
voices throughout Europe support this view, stating that fees are heavily needed to sup-
plement public educational expenditures in order to bring funding back to internationally
adequate levels (Barr, 2005, Chapter 4; European Commission, 2005; HRK, 2005). On the
contrary, critics argue that enhanced access to private ﬁnancing sources would actuate a
withdrawal of public funding, such that the eﬀect on total educational spending would be
low or even zero.1 This fear is fuelled by recent experiences in the UK and Australia after
the introduction of tuition fees, succinctly summarized by Barr (2004, p. 342):
If fees are set by government, rising fee income can be oﬀset by falling taxpayer
contributions. ... Australia is a graphic example: government introduced centrally
set fees 1989 to address a funding crisis; by 2000, the system was back in crisis.
Equally, the introduction of fees in the UK did not net any extra money.
This paper develops a simple model of higher education ﬁnance to address the question
whether the option to implement tuition fees improves the quality of university education
and to what extent crowding out of public funds occurs. This question is of particular impor-
tance for the debate in Germany, where the ban on tuition fees was recently discarded by the
Federal Constitutional Court and, similar to the above-mentioned countries, fees are intro-
duced gradually at levels determined by the political process. As a result, higher education
funding rests on both public and private sources being controlled by the government. These
aspects are typically neglected in models of university ﬁnance reform, which either focus on
the polar alternatives of pure public vs. private spending (Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde, 2000;
Wildasin, 2000; B¨ uttner and Schwager, 2004), or allow for individual adjustments of higher
education quality (Andersson and Konrad, 2003).2
In many countries, including Germany, the dispute on university reform goes hand in hand
with a discussion on the proper allocation of educational competencies, in particular between
federal and regional levels. From a theoretical perspective, arguments in favor of decentral-
ization are weak due to a variety of interregional spill-overs, most notably graduate mobility
undermining the incentives for public funding on a regional basis (Konrad, 1995; Wildasin,
2000).3 As this may constitute an argument why tuition fees may serve to crowd out regional
1 Of course, the discussion on the interrelation between ﬁnancing sources and quality is just one aspect in
the voluminous tuition fee debate. Other topics ﬁguring prominently in public discussion include lifetime
redistribution (Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte, 2002), and social selectivity due to ﬁnancial constraints (De
Fraja, 2001).
2 Therefore, our notion of ”private funding” means paying for a government service of predetermined quality
rather than private choice of educational quality.
3 Other important arguments in this realm are the comparability of degrees (Somanathan, 1998) and abilityEducational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 3
public spending in particular, we investigate how their possible introduction aﬀects educa-
tional expenditures for both centralized and decentralized decision making. On the one hand,
this distinction is novel to the literature, which addresses the disposability of government in-
struments in terms of either diﬀerent expenditure categories (Konrad, 1995, Poutvaara, 2004)
or tax arrangements (Poutvaara, 2001). On the other hand, it is relevant for the German case
where fees are set by the federal states.4 Hence, lessons from countries with more centralized
fees like Australia and the UK may not apply.
We ﬁnd that the degree of decentralization matters for the eﬀect of the availability of tuition
fees on university quality. When funding is determined by central government, fees substitute
public funds extensively without improving the quality of university education. However, with
regional decision making, per capita spending on higher education increases when tuition fees
are charged. These diﬀerences originate in the higher elasticity of student enrolment with
respect to fee increases at the regional than at the federal level. The possibility to study in
the other region limits the ability of the regional governments to shift the ﬁnancing burden
of higher education to students.
This result has important implications for the assessment of educational federalism. We
argue that the option to utilize tuition fees can provide an argument in favor of, rather than
against a decentralization of educational competencies. Our analysis identiﬁes situations
where centralization leads to higher quality than decentralization when funding is restricted
to be only public, but decentralization performs better when tuition fees are admitted.
This ﬁnding is rooted in a distortion of the incentives to support university education by
the political process. Not attending university himself, the decisive voter recognizes only
the indirect beneﬁts of higher education and neglects the positive direct eﬀects on students.
This renders spending under centralization ineﬃcient and opens up the possibility of a better
provision by decentralization even though regions are symmetric. Hence, our mechanism
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from Besley and Coate (2003), where a superiority of decentralized systems
originates in the heterogeneity of individual preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basics of the model. Section 3
derives and compares spending levels under centralized and decentralized decision making
when tuition fees are banned. In section 4, this ban is abolished. Section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
sorting (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996). However, regional autonomy for both education and taxes can
be beneﬁcial when governments lack commitment (Andersson and Konrad, 2003). By concentrating on
educational competition, this aspect is not addressed by our contribution.
4 Konrad (1995) shows that regional competition encourages public infrastructure expenditures at the ex-
pense of public education, whereas Poutvaara (2004) argues that higher graduate mobility shifts public
educational resources into internationally less applicable skills. Poutvaara (2001) shows that education is
spurred by earmarking the tax payments of graduates to the region where education was undertaken.4 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
2 The Model
Consider a federation formed by two ex ante identical regions i ∈ {A,B}. In both regions,
competitive ﬁrms employ capital and labor to produce the same output good by a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. International capital mobility pegs the interest rate at the level
r for both individuals and ﬁrms. Hence, the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor w is constant
as well.
We focus on two subsequent periods t = 1,2 in this economy. In period 1, there are two
generations, called the parents and the children. In each region, a mass of children which
we normalize to unity is born by P parents. In period 2, however, only the children are
alive.5 Children are heterogeneous in terms of the ability to beneﬁt from education, a, and
the costs of moving into the other region in period 1 and 2, denoted by µt, t = 1,2. To
simplify matters, parents are assumed to be immobile.
At the beginning of each period, the children are informed about their individual realization
of the respective mobility cost. These costs reﬂect not only immediate transportation costs,
but also non-monetary aspects of leaving a familiar environment, which may be considered
positive by some individuals. Therefore, we allow for non-positive values of total mobility
cost. For the sake of concreteness, costs are uncorrelated between periods and µt follows a






t ≤ 0. Hence, the probability of facing a
migration cost µt is 1/(µt − µ
t).
In addition to residence, children decide in period 1 whether to take up a study. Doing so
augments the eﬀective supply of labor in period 2 to:
1 + ah(e),
where a reﬂects the ability to beneﬁt from higher education and h(·) is a human capital
production function with the usual properties (h0 > 0,h00 < 0,h0(0) = ∞ and h(0) = 0).
Human capital depends on total higher education expenditures or quality e = g+f, the sum
of both public funds g and tuition fees f. Taking into account income taxation at the rate τ
and tuition cost gives lifetime net income:
IH =
(1 − τ)(1 + ah(e))w
1 + r
− f.
Like Konrad (1995), Keen and Marchand (1997) and Poutvaara (2004), we treat the income
tax rate τ as ﬁxed throughout the paper. Hence, the paper focusses on the eﬀect of mobility
5 Setting up a fully ﬂedged overlapping generations model would complicate notation without aﬀecting the
results. See Konrad (1995) for a similar setup considering public higher education and infrastructure, but
no private education spending.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 5
on educational and not on tax competition. We discuss this assumption in the conclusions
section.
Children not attending university supply one eﬃciency unit of labor in both periods. This
leads to net lifetime earnings:






The ability distribution is bimodal. In each region, the number A of children is born with
a high ability to beneﬁt from university education (a = 1), whereas the rest (1 − A) has no
such talent (a = 0). Hence, the total number of talented individuals is 2A.
The decision to study results from a comparison of lifetime incomes. While untalented in-





− 1) ≥ f, (1)
that is, the increase in net earnings at least compensates for tuition cost. Put diﬀerently, the
number of students S is positive only if the quality of education exceeds the minimum level
¯ e0(f), for which (1) holds with equality:
S =
(
A : e ≥ ¯ e0(f)
0 : e < ¯ e0(f)
. (2)
Obviously, this threshold increases in the tuition fee level: ¯ e0
0(f) = (1 + r)/((1 − τ)h0(¯ e0))
with ¯ e0(0) given by h(¯ e0(0)) = 1 + r.









This expression is maximized either by having no higher education at all (e = S = 0) or all
talented going to university and receiving the same quality e∗, characterized by:
h0(e∗)w = 1 + r, (3)
the equality of the marginal returns to investment in human and physical capital. To make
the problem meaningful, we posit that higher education is socially productive, that is, the6 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
aggregate surplus of the latter solution is higher than if no-one attended university:
(h(e∗) − (1 + r))w > e∗(1 + r). (4)
Because aggregate production is concave in e, social productivity obtains for all e ∈ (0, ¯ e]
where ¯ e > e∗ is implicitly deﬁned by (h(¯ e) − (1 + r))w = ¯ e(1 + r).6
3 Public Funding of Higher Education
This section investigates spending on higher education when all funds are public, that is,
tuition fees are not allowed: f = 0. The level of public spending results from the political
process.
Throughout the industrialized world, (potential) students make up for a minor part of the
constituency. As a consequence, public support for higher education depends heavily on the
existence of some indirect beneﬁcial eﬀects for the general public. While some approaches
focus on externalities (Creedy and Francois, 1990) or factor complementarities (Poutvaara
and Kanniainen, 2000), we conceive public higher education as the result of intergenerational
redistribution.
Like Konrad (1995), we devise of a situation where political process is dominated by the
parents who dispose of two policy instruments in period 1.7 First, current tax revenues can
be spent either on a demogrant transfer b to the parents or on higher education g. Second,
the parents can issue government debt D to be repaid by the children in period 2, enabling
parents to convert future tax payments into period 1 consumption. Hence, the incentive for
public spending on higher education originates in a widening of the future tax base.8 Since
the transfer is uniform, earnings heterogeneity among parents is unimportant for political
decisions and is therefore omitted from the model.
6 A comparison of (1) and (4) highlights the imperfect congruence between eﬃciency in higher education
and university attendance. For pure public funding, the talented go to university also for ineﬃciently low
qualities e ≥ ¯ e0(0). With pure private tuition, this is only true if the fee is smaller than (1 − τ)e
∗.
7 There are two obvious ways to justify this assumption. First, one could assume a higher political power
of the old in the sense of a gerontocracy. Second, one could posit equal political inﬂuence, but P > 1,
such that the decisive voter is a parent. In either case, the political process leads to results similar to
Leviathan-type governments (Andersson and Konrad, 2003).
8 While we assume that this tax base is extracted by the use of government debt, an analogous argument
could be developed in terms of pay-as-you-go pension beneﬁts which are ﬁnanced by wage contributions.
See e.g. Konrad (1995) and Soares (2005) for a respective comparison between decentralized and centralized
education funding. It is well known that social security obligations can be perceived as an implicit debt
on future generations.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 7
3.1 Centralization
Consider ﬁrst a setting where education and debt policies are set by a central government.
Then, the government budget constraints in both periods are:
T1 + D = 2P · b + 2S · g, T2 = D(1 + r) (5)
where period 1 tax revenues results from those children not attending university:
T1 = 2(1 − S)τw,
whereas all children pay a proportional income tax in the next period:9
T2 = 2τw[S(1 + h(g)) + (1 − S)]. (6)
Consolidating the budget constraints gives the net transfer to parents as a function of edu-











Expenditures on public higher education are chosen in order to maximize (7) subject to (2).
Due to the concavity of the human capital production function, the beneﬁt is concave in g
attaining the level 2(1−S)τw(2+r)/(1+r) for both g = 0 and some positive ˜ g < ¯ e. Let ¯ gC









¯ gC : ¯ e0(0) ≤ ¯ gC
¯ e0(0) : ¯ gC < ¯ e0(0) < ˜ g
0 : ¯ e0(0) ≥ ˜ g
Proposition 1. For all τ < 1, centralized pure public higher education is underfunded.
Proof. Ineﬃciency holds whenever ¯ e0 ≥ ¯ gC because e∗ > ¯ e0(0) > 0 from (1) and (4). For
¯ gC > ¯ e0,
d¯ gC
dτ > 0 with ¯ gC = e∗ iﬀ τ = 1. 
The parental motive to provide higher education originates in the appropriation of period 2
tax revenues through government debt. However, aggregate output increases by more than
the tax revenue whenever the tax rate is not conﬁscatory.10 As in Konrad (1995), this renders
the incentives to ﬁnance university education inferior.11
9 Additional period 1 tax payments by parents could be introduced without aﬀecting the results.
10 To simplify the analysis, we have omitted any personal eﬀort cost of attending university. Obviously, the
presence of such a cost would destroy the incentives for university education for τ = 1 such that centralized
pure public education would never be eﬃcient.8 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
Without loss of substantial insights, the subsequent analysis concentrates on the case where
the student participation constraint is not binding in the centralized equilibrium, that is
¯ gC ≥ ¯ e0.
Financing higher education by general taxation has often been criticized on grounds of regres-
sive redistributional eﬀects (Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde, 2000). These eﬀects obtain also in




increases monotonously in g. This is due to the fact that parents are not interested in intra-,
but intergenerational redistribution, which is promoted by fostering the earnings of the tal-
ented children.
3.2 Decentralization
Consider now a situation where policies are chosen autonomously at regional levels. Similar













where i is the regional index. However, the existence of both interregional mobility and a
ﬁscal equalization scheme modiﬁes tax revenues and costs in three distinctive ways, compared
to the above section.
First, mobility in period 2 implies that not all graduates of a region will pay income taxes in
that region. Graduate earnings being the same across regions due to the uniform income tax
rate, all households with negative mobility costs move to the other region at the beginning
of period 2. As a consequence, each region collects taxes from its period-1 residents with
positive old age mobility cost µ2 and all former residents in the other region with negative











τ(1 + h(gj))wSj + τw(1 − S), (11)
11 Similar results obtain in Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte (2002) and Wigger and von Weizs¨ acker (2001). In
Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte (2002), altruistic parents are willing to forego current tax revenue in order to
ﬁnance higher education which fosters future redistribution among the oﬀspring via a progressive income
tax. In our model, selﬁsh parents redistribute resources to themselves. Wigger and von Weizs¨ acker (2001)
assume that the government maximizes a ”tax dividend” in the form of future student earnings. However,
they do not address the problem of underfunding caused by an imperfect appropriation of investment
returns.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 9
where j 6= i and the last term is due to the fact that the number of non-academics with
negative µ2 is the same in both regions.
Second, ﬁscal equalization drives a wedge between the taxes collected and the taxes received
by each region. Let δ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of taxes that remain in the region of collection,
revenues for i amount to:
Ti
2 = τδTCi
2 + τ(1 − δ)TC
j
2,
which by using (11) can be expressed as:
Ti











is a measure of the ﬁscal externality or ”leakage” of public investment due to graduate mobility
and ﬁscal equalization: Region i ends up with only the fraction 1−π of the tax payments of
its former students.
Third, not all talented children born in i will necessarily study at the local university. They
do so only if the individual period 1 mobility cost exceeds the earnings diﬀerential between
regions:
µ1 ≥ (1 − τ)w[h(gj) − h(gi)]/(1 + r), (13)
where (13) suppresses solutions boundary to simplify the exposition by presuming that both
gi and gj exceed ¯ e0(0) . Using the properties of the distribution of µ1 gives the number of













where the subscript refers to the region of origin and the superscript to the region of study.
Accordingly, the number of students in i originating from j is 1 − Si
j, such that the total



























< 0.10 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
At last, all children not attending university get the same period 1 income in both regions.
Accordingly, only those with negative mobility cost move. Since the interregional net ﬂow
of non-students is zero, period 1 tax revenue is independent of the degree of educational
federalism: like in period 2, each region has (1 − S) non-academic resident children.
Therefore, the problem of the parents in region i is to maximize (10) with respect to gi,











− gi(1 + r) + τ(1 − π)(1 + h(gi))w
i
+ πτ(1 + h(gj))w
∂Sj
∂gi ≤ 0
with equality if gi ≥ ¯ e0. The respective second order condition:
∂2bi










−(1 + r)gi + τ(1 − π)(1 + h(gi))w

< 0 (16)
is assumed to be fulﬁlled. This can be ensured by a suﬃciently low sensibility of location
choice with respect to quality diﬀerentials.12
According to (15), improving local educational expenditures has three eﬀects. First, it aﬀects
the diﬀerence between marginal tax revenues and cost for all actual students. Second, it
attracts additional students who generate both tax revenue and cost. And third, the reduction
of students in the other region impinges on tax revenues to the extent of ﬁscal leakage.
We concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where gi = gj,Si = Sj = S, and ∂Sj
∂gi = −∂Si
∂gi .
Therefore, the equilibrium spending level in both regions is either ¯ gD solving:
¯ ΩD =










τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(¯ gD))w − ¯ gD(1 + r)

= 0, (17)
if ¯ gD ≥ ¯ e0 or is zero otherwise.
In what follows, we assume that ∂2¯ ΩD
∂(¯ gD)2 < 0 holds in equilibrium.13 Otherwise, the equilibrium
would feature some awkward properties. For example, a higher opportunity cost of higher
12 If µ1 − µ
1 is suﬃciently high and attracting students increases b (τ(1 − π)w[1 + h(g




i)w > 1 + r must hold due to (15), such that all terms in (16) are negative.
13 Again, this is always the case if the increase in local enrolment due to rising quality is not too intense.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 11
education in form of an increased interest rate would then be conducive to public spending











1)(1+r)2τ(1 + h(¯ gD))w
∂2¯ ΩD/∂(¯ gD)2 .
Proposition 2. Under decentralized pure public funding, educational spending decreases
in the ﬁscal externality for π ∈ [0, ¯ π]. There is no regional provision of higher education if
π ∈ [¯ π,1]. Educational quality is higher than under centralization if π < ˜ π, with ˜ π < 1/2.








∂2 ¯ ΩD/∂(¯ gD)2 < 0,
whenever (17) characterizes the equilibrium. Moreover, all terms in (17) are negative for
π = 1, and hence ¯ gD = 0. For π = 0, instead, (17) becomes:








τ(1 + h(gD))w − gD(1 + r)

= 0. (18)
By (8), (18) can only be fulﬁlled for ¯ gD > ¯ gC. Because ¯ gD is continuous in π, there must be
a level ˜ π for which ¯ gD = ¯ gC, and a threshold ¯ π for which the participation becomes binding,
with ˜ π < ¯ π due to ¯ gC > ¯ e0. Hence, ¯ gD falls to zero for π > ¯ π. For π = 1/2, the second
column in (17) is negative, implying ¯ gD < ¯ gC as the ﬁrst row would also become negative for
the level ¯ gC. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition. While the negative relation between perceived marginal
return and higher educational investment is straightforward, the relative performance of
decentralization is easily explained in terms of the strategic interrelation between spending












The sign of this expression equals the sign of the square bracketed term in the numerator,
which captures the basic educational tradeoﬀ faced by each region. On the one hand, it has
an incentive to attract students (and later taxpayers) by providing a better quality than the
competitor. This creates a strategic complementarity between local educational expenditures.
On the other hand, there is also a substitutability because each region can free ride on the
expenditures of the other region by relying on ﬁscal equalization and the immigration of
some graduates. The relative importance of these eﬀects is determined by the extent of the12 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
ﬁscal externality. If for example π = 0, regions appropriate all later tax revenues of local
students and engage in a ﬁerce competition for students leading to expenditures above the
centralized level.14 Algebraically, (19) is positive and strategic complementarity prevails.15
In the other polar case π = 1, however, own educational investments would only beneﬁt the
other region. Therefore, an intermediate level of ﬁscal leakage exists for which centralization
and decentralization yield identical quality.
This result puts some caution on the popular ﬁnding that decentralized education policies
are inferior to centralized ones. Konrad (1995), Justman and Thisse (1997) and Del Rey
(2001) establish a respective result for public human capital investment which is based on
the mobility of graduates, but disregards any beneﬁcial eﬀects of attracting students to a
region. In a model with student mobility only, B¨ uttner and Schwager (2004) ﬁnd educa-
tional expenditures to be strategic substitutes between regions. However, this result hinges
on the assumption that each region cares for the earnings of all its citizens wherever they
reside. Obviously, this downplays the ﬁscal eﬀect of graduates remaining abroad.16 Bailey
et al. (2003) present some empirical evidence that competition among US state universities
reduces educational spending. In a model calibrated to the US where public education can
be supplemented by private purchases, Soares (2005) ﬁnds large welfare gains from shifting
from community-wide to nation-wide funding.
In contrast, Gradstein and Justman (1995) have shown that decentralization raises spending
levels. However, their argument is set up in terms of human capital investment of immobile
residents in order to attract mobile physical capital. In our model, educational spending is
used to attract students and their future tax payments. Moreover, decentralized spending is
excessive in Gradstein and Justman (1995) because - in contrast to our model - centralization
would be eﬃcient.17
Nevertheless, centralization leads to higher expenditures than decentralization in a number
of cases, including π = 1/2 which reﬂects a situation without graduate mobility (µ
2 = 0),
but full ﬁscal equalization (δ = 1/2). Moreover, the ﬁscal externality can even preclude a
decentralized supply of higher education, although centralized provision would exist (π > ˜ π).
14 With the results at hand, we can not exclude the possibility of ineﬃciently high provision, as the equilibrium
condition h
0(¯ g
D)w ≤ (1 + r)/τ is not incompatible with ¯ g
D > e
∗. However, Proposition 4, to be derived
at a later stage, implies that decentralization leads unambiguously to underfunding.
15 The sign of (19) for π = 0 follows from (15) recognizing that the per student tax revenue is positive.
16 Moreover, the opposite result obtains with this regional target function once only graduates are allowed
to be mobile (Justman and Thisse, 2000).
17 Analogously, Konrad (1995) arrives at overprovision of public infrastructure serving to capture mobile
labor.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 13
4 Allowing for Tuition Fees
We now consider a setting where higher education can be ﬁnanced by both public and private
funds. In line with recent real-world reforms, we posit that the level of tuition fees is set by the
government. Since all individuals have access to the perfect capital market and educational
success is certain, the well known problems of wealth-biased demand for privately funded
education are absent and require no further state intervention.18
4.1 Centralization








− 2S(e − f)

, (20)
with respect to e and f subject to student participation (e ≥ ¯ e0(f)), tax revenues in period
2 being:
T2 = 2τw[S(1 + h(e)) + (1 − S)]. (21)
Public funding amounts to the diﬀerence between total and private expenditures.
Proposition 3. Under centralization, the availability of tuition fees leads to a withdrawal
of public funding. Tuition fees do not improve educational quality.





which is solved by ¯ gD. Moreover, ¯ gD is feasible for f = 0. However, for any given e, (20)
increases monotonously in f provided that e ≥ ¯ e0(f). Therefore, (20) is maximized by
e = ¯ gC = ¯ e0(fC) and gC = ¯ gC − fC. The proposition follows immediately from comparing
to the case f = 0. 
Tuition fees have no impact on the quality preferred by parents, as they do not aﬀect the
marginal return and cost of total higher education. However, the fees serve to shift the
ﬁnancing burden on the students as long as they participate. Therefore, there is full crowding
out of public funds up to the point where the talented become indiﬀerent towards educational
choice as illustrated by Figure 2.
As a consequence, the model provides some support to the assertion that allowing for state
regulated tuition fees is not conducive to the quality of higher education. The next section
investigates to what extent this argument applies to decentralization.
18 As pointed out by Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000), the precise form of fee repayment facilities matters
for student risk taking under uncertainty. See Poutvaara (2004) for an extension of the analysis of tuition
fee designs to the presence of graduate mobility.14 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
4.2 Decentralization
With regional decision making, tuition fees aﬀect the location choice of students. A talented
child born in i will go to university in the region of birth only if the migration cost exceeds



















(1 − τ)w[h(ei) − h(ej)]
1 + r
+ fj − fi)
#
,

























− Si(ei − fi)

, (23)
with respect to ei and fi, considering student participation and the tax revenue:
Ti
2 = τw(1 − π)(1 + h(ei))Si + τwπ(1 + h(ej))Sj + τw(1 − S).
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∂fi ≤ 0. (25)
19 These ceteris paribus eﬀects have to be disentangled from the question how tuition fees aﬀect enrolment if













and is positive (negative) if public funding is suﬃciently low (high).Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 15
The interpretation of (24) is analogous to (15). Regarding tuition fees, each region trades oﬀ
the reduction in public spending with the ﬁnancial consequences of deterring students to the
other region.
As a consequence, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by:
bi





[(1 + r)(f − e) + τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(e))w] ≤ 0
bi




[(f − e)(1 + r) + τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(e))w] ≤ 0. (27)
Under the same assumptions as under pure public funding, bi is concave in ei. Moreover, bi










In general, there are three alternatives regarding the structure of the equilibrium: tuition
fees can be zero, positive, but low enough to ensure participation (moderate) or too high to
attract students to universities (excessive). The following lemma rules out the last case.
Lemma. No symmetric equilibrium violates the student participation constraint.
Proof. Suppose both regions choose e and f such that the student participation constraint is
violated. Then, each talented pays taxes in amount τw(2+r)/(1+r) from his non-academic








1+r −1)w−e. This expression
is positive whenever higher education is socially productive. As socially productive e always
exist, there is no equilibrium where both regions violate the student participation constraint.

Each region has an incentive to provide some university education when all student rents are
extracted by tuition fees. Hence, unlike in the pure public funding case, the nonexistence of
higher education under decentralization is not an issue.
Hence, the symmetric equilibrium remain has either zero or moderate tuition fees. As the
properties of the former correspond to the analysis of section 3.2, we now characterize the
moderate case:






The utilization of tuition fees improves higher education quality. However, total spending is
ineﬃciently low.16 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees











Hence, total quality chosen according to (26) increases in the level of the fee. Underfunding
results from h0(eD) > h0(e∗) by comparing (28) and (3).
The positive eﬀect of tuition fees on overall quality arises from their regional deterrence:
A regional substitution of tuition fees for public funds on a one-to-one basis would induce
the emigration of some talented children. Each region wants to avoid this - because of the
loss of either future tax payments or current tuition revenues - and therefore chooses no full
crowding out of public funds. As a consequence, equilibrium quality under decentralization
is higher for moderate fees than if they were banned. These results notwithstanding, there is
no full resolution of the underfunding problem.20
Moreover, the above ﬁnding begs the question whether tuition fees will be introduced at all.








= −(1 + r) + τ(1 − π)h0(¯ gD) (29)
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−(1 + r)¯ gD + τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(¯ gD))w

> 0,





This condition is the more likely met, the higher the ﬁnancial gains from introducing fees, that
is, the lower the preexisting level of public funding and the higher the marginal productivity
of given expenditures. A higher tax rate, however, has a negative impact, as it mitigates the
problem of pure public underfunding and increases the marginal revenue loss due to student
deterrence. Accordingly, the eﬀect of the ﬁscal externality on the incentives to introduce fees
is ambiguous. Here, the marginal cost of student mobility decreases in quality because tax
revenues are concave in e. However, the wedge between eﬃcient and pure public funding is
increased.
We are now in the position to compare the performance of centralized and decentralized
educational competencies. As a ﬁrst result:
20 Since total expenditures in the presence of fees are at least as high as without fees, one can conclude that
decentralized pure public funding leads to underprovision as stated above.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 17
Proposition 5. For moderate tuition fees, decentralized education leads to higher quality
than centralized education if the ﬁscal externality is suﬃciently low.
Proof. Comparing (17) and (28) gives eD ≷ ¯ gD ⇐⇒ π ≶ (1 − τ)/τ.
Like under pure public funding, decentralization provides better teaching quality than cen-
tralization when the ﬁscal externality is suﬃciently low. However, this threshold value is
aﬀected by the availability of tuition fees.
Proposition 6. When tuition fees are available, decentralization leads to higher educational
expenditures than centralization for π < ˜ ˜ π, ˜ π < ˜ ˜ π.
Proof. Since fees do not decrease total spending, eD > ¯ gD for all π < ˜ π. For π = ˜ π, de-
centralization implies higher total expenditures than centralization when fees are introduced.
Therefore, ˜ π < (1 − τ)/τ must hold. Moreover, (30) is fulﬁlled for ˜ π: h0(¯ gD) = (1 + r)/τ >
(1 + r)/(1 − τ˜ π). By continuity, there must be π > ˜ π for which eD > ¯ gD. 
Regions face an incentive to introduce fees for the level of the ﬁscal externality equalizing
centralized and decentralized expenditures under pure public funding. Then, decentralization
must provide a higher quality, because total expenditures increase in f. Figure 3 illustrates.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
This ﬁnding has consequences for the proper allocation of educational responsibilities.
Corollary. With pure public education, decentralization leads to higher welfare than cen-
tralization for π < ˜ π. When tuition fees are allowed, decentralization delivers higher welfare
for π < ˜ ˜ π.
Proof. follows from Proposition 6 and the fact that decentralization never leads to excessive
funding. 
Hence, educational federalism matters for the quality of universities, with the availability
of fees strengthening the case for decentralization. For any ﬁscal externality π ∈ [˜ π, ˜ ˜ π], the
availability of tuition fees makes the welfare superior system the centralized rather than the
decentralized one.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality eﬀects of state regulated tuition fees depend cru-
cially on the degree of educational decentralization. We show that such fees do not improve
total expenditures when educational decisions are centralized, a result in line with recent
experiences in Australia and the UK. However, federal competition precludes a similar de-
velopment under decentralized decision-making and tuition fees contribute to the quality of18 Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees
higher education.21 Therefore, the availability of fees can make a shift from a centralized to
a decentralized system of university ﬁnance worthwhile.
As it stands, the model has used a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we have
developed our arguments in the context of a two period setup rather than in a model of
overlapping generations. The latter would complicate the analysis but leave the general
results unaﬀected. The most serious modiﬁcation would be the consideration of parental
mobility, responding to beneﬁt diﬀerentials across regions. While the concomitant increase
in the number of beneﬁt recipients would diminish the gains from quality enhancements, the
higher caution of decentralized decision makers in substituting tuition fees for public funding
would not be aﬀected.
Second, we have concentrated on symmetric equilibria under decentralization. Certainly, the
possibility of regional disparities, possibly produced by diﬀerences in regional endowments,
requires further investigation. However, it should be stressed that heterogeneity aﬀects both
decentralized and centralized decisions (Besley and Coate, 2003).
Third, we have assumed that all students have the same ability to beneﬁt from higher edu-
cation. With heterogenous abilities, tuition fees would aﬀect the size and the productivity of
the student body, as the marginal student would refrain from attending university. To the
extent that this reduces tax revenues, parents would want to compensate for this by providing
a higher quality. Hence, crowding out of public funding under centralization would be less
severe than the above analysis suggests. However, as parents face an analogous incentive also
at the regional level, no qualitative diﬀerence to the above ﬁndings can be expected.
And fourth, we have not addressed the issue of regional tax competition. A number of
studies has shown that the strive for mobile graduates puts a downward pressure on regional
taxes, see e.g. Anderson and Konrad (2003). As a consequence, incentives to provide pure
public education under decentralization are reduced. However, the eﬀects in the presence of
tuition fees are not straightforward. First, a lower tax rate slackens the student participation
constraint for given expenditures and fees. Second, tax competition can be mitigated as
fees make up for a ﬁnancing source independent of future student residence. And third,
the fundamental diﬀerence in incentives to substitute public funds for tuition fees derived
above still applies. In general, we expect that the overall result depends on the division of
educational and tax responsibilities between local and federal governments, an issue that we
leave for future research just like the related question whether results could be improved by
university autonomy.
21 This hypothesis could basically be tested by German data once the funding reform is completed.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 19
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